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UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL 
CENTER V. NASSAR: THE SUPREME COURT’S “HEADS THE 
EMPLOYER WINS, TAILS THE EMPLOYEE LOSES” DECISION 
INTRODUCTION 
In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt two blows to employees and 
the protections Congress guaranteed them under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 by taking employer-friendly stances on fundamental questions 
regarding the interpretation and application of Title VII.1 In fact, the Supreme 
Court’s recent employment law jurisprudence has led Justice Ginsburg to label 
it as a “heads the employer wins, tails the employee loses” analysis.2 In one of 
the recent decisions, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. 
Nassar, the focus of this Note, the Supreme Court enforced a “but-for” 
causation standard for retaliation claims under Title VII, even after recognizing 
that Title VII status-based discrimination claims—claims involving direct 
discrimination based upon a person’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin—enjoy a lesser motivating-factor causation standard.3 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s decision rested in part upon the text and 
structure of a 1991 amendment to Title VII—an amendment that Congress 
itself labeled as an attempt to broaden protection under Title VII.4 Instead, the 
Court construed the amendment in a way that actually restricts the protection 
intended for victims of retaliation.5 Moreover, the Supreme Court disregarded 
established precedent that has both defined retaliation as just another form of 
status-based discrimination and determined that it should be treated as such.6 
Thus, the Supreme Court effectively created a distinction between different 
 
 1. See Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013); Vance v. Ball 
State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2454 (2013). 
 2. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2545 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 3. Id. at 2528 (majority opinion). Status-based discrimination is direct discrimination in 
hiring, firing, promotion, and other employment decisions on the basis of an individual’s 
protected status, i.e., discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). Retaliation is discrimination on account of an employee 
having opposed, complained of, or sought remedies for, unlawful workplace discrimination. See 
id. § 2000e-3(a). These provisions will be discussed later in this Note. See infra Part I. 
 4. H.R. REP. NO. 102–40, pt. II, at 2–4 (1991). See infra Part III. 
 5. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 6. See infra Part I. 
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types of discrimination and made it harder for employees to get relief for 
retaliatory efforts of their employers. 
The effects of this decision are immediate and catastrophic, especially for 
trial courts left with the mess of trying to properly instruct juries in Title VII 
cases in which the plaintiff alleges both status-based discrimination and 
retaliation (a common occurrence).7 Indeed, “[a]sking jurors to determine 
liability based on different standards in a single case is virtually certain to sow 
confusion.”8 Moreover, because the decision weakens Title VII’s prohibition 
against retaliation, employees will be less willing to confront discrimination in 
the workplace for fear of the retaliatory efforts of their employers.9 Title VII’s 
prohibition against status-based discrimination depends in large part on 
employees policing their employers, and, thus, without their participation, Title 
VII’s overall scheme will suffer.10 In light of these important adverse effects, 
Congress must act. Indeed, as Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent in Nassar, 
the Supreme Court’s “misguided judgment” in Nassar “should prompt yet 
another Civil Rights Restoration Act.”11 
Part I of this Note will discuss the applicable sections of Title VII, as well 
as Supreme Court decisions interpreting and broadening antiretaliation 
provisions. Part II will analyze the Supreme Court’s decision in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court’s first major decision regarding causation 
standards in mixed-motive cases under Title VII. Part III will then discuss the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 and its amendments to Title VII, as well as lower 
courts’ decisions regarding the applicability of Price Waterhouse and the 1991 
Act to Title VII retaliation claims. Part IV will then analyze Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc., a key turning point in the Court’s jurisprudence 
regarding causation standards. Part V will provide a detailed analysis of 
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the Supreme 
Court’s most recent decision regarding a motivating-factor standard in Title 
VII retaliation claims. Part VI will provide a critique of the Court’s decision in 
Nassar. Finally, Part VII will propose that Congress amend Title VII in light of 
the Court’s decision. 
 
 7. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2546 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See infra Part VI.C. 
 10. See infra Part VI.C. 
 11. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion of a 
“Civil Rights Restoration Act” refers to the 1991 Civil Rights Act, a set of amendments to Title 
VII, and other statutes Congress enacted in response to Supreme Court decisions which reduced 
the protections afforded to individuals under those statutes. See also infra Part III. 
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I.  TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) makes it “an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any 
individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”12 This provision prohibits “status-based discrimination,” the 
first of two categories of wrongful employer conduct condemned by Title 
VII.13 The second category of wrongful employer conduct prohibited by Title 
VII is employer retaliation against an employee who complains of 
discrimination in the workplace.14 Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation 
provides that an employer commits an unlawful employment practice when it 
“discriminate[s] against any individual . . . because he has opposed any 
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because 
he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”15 Thus, while 
status-based discrimination is direct discrimination based on an individual’s 
protected status, retaliation is discrimination for complaining about status-
based discrimination.16 
Prohibitions against retaliation are necessary to reinforce prohibitions 
against status-based discrimination;17 indeed, “[t]he realities of retaliation in 
 
 12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2006). The full language of the provision is as follows: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or 
classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. 
Id. 
 13. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522. 
 14. Id. 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The exact language of this provision is as follows: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any 
of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-
management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, 
including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a 
labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for 
membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice 
by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 
Id. 
 16. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 17. Individuals find it difficult to acknowledge that they have been discriminated against; 
once they overcome that hurdle and recognize the discrimination, they then struggle with 
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response to claiming discrimination necessitate strong legal protection from 
retaliation if the law is to provide meaningful nondiscrimination guarantees.”18 
Even the Supreme Court has noted the importance of antiretaliation provisions: 
Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of employees who 
are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses. “Plainly, effective 
enforcement could thus only be expected if employees felt free to approach 
officials with their grievances.” Interpreting the antiretaliation provision to 
provide broad protection from retaliation helps ensure the cooperation upon 
which accomplishment of the Act’s primary objective depends.19 
Many Supreme Court decisions have in fact demonstrated the Supreme 
Court’s willingness to interpret Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation in a 
way that strengthens the prohibition against status-based discrimination.20 For 
example, in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, the 
Supreme Court held that the “scope of the antiretaliation provision extends 
beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.”21 
In that case, after the employee complained about workplace discrimination, 
the employer changed the employee’s job responsibilities and suspended her 
 
challenging the discrimination. One commentator has described the reluctance many individuals 
face in first recognizing that they have been discriminated against: 
As anyone who has experienced bias or prejudice knows, naming and challenging 
discrimination is socially and psychologically difficult. By the time retaliation intervenes 
to punish someone for alleging discrimination, that person has already overcome a myriad 
of psychological and social forces operating to suppress that claim. Research in social 
psychology has documented a marked reluctance among the targets of discrimination to 
label and confront their experiences as such . . . . Retaliation performs important work in 
institutions. One of the most palpable functions of retaliation is to suppress challenges to 
perceived inequality. Retaliation performs much of this work without ever actually being 
inflicted on the potential challenger. Decisions about whether to challenge discrimination 
rest on a careful balancing of the costs and benefits of doing so. 
Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 25–26, 36 (2005). The fear of retaliation 
will be discussed in relation to Title VII’s antiretaliation statute later in this Note. See infra Part 
VI. 
 18. Brake, supra note 17, at 42. 
 19. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006) (citations omitted). The 
Court further clarified: 
The antiretaliation provision seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an 
employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or 
advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees. The substantive provision seeks to 
prevent injury to individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status. The antiretaliation 
provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct. 
Id. at 63. 
 20. For a more in-depth analysis of the Supreme Court’s pro-plaintiff retaliation decisions, 
see Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115 (2014). 
 21. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 67. 
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for multiple weeks without pay.22 Some courts had required employees to 
demonstrate a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of 
employment to succeed on a retaliation claim, but the Supreme Court 
determined that any materially adverse employment action could constitute 
retaliation as long as the action would dissuade a reasonable worker from 
complaining about the discrimination.23 Moreover, in Thompson v. North 
American Stainless, L.P., the Supreme Court held that a third party who never 
complained of status-based discrimination but is the subject of retaliation after 
a different individual complained of status-based discrimination can maintain a 
retaliation claim under Title VII.24 
Furthermore, not only has the Supreme Court broadened the scope of Title 
VII’s antiretaliation provisions, it has also shown a willingness to view 
retaliation as just another form of discrimination in other contexts beyond Title 
VII.25 Indeed, even when statutes do not explicitly proscribe retaliation but do 
proscribe status-based discrimination, the Supreme Court has determined that 
the status-based discrimination prohibition within the statute implicitly 
contains a prohibition against retaliation.26 In doing so, the Court has stated 
that “[r]etaliation against a person because [he] has complained of . . . 
discrimination is another form of intentional . . . discrimination.”27 Thus, in 
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, the Court determined that an 
individual could bring a retaliation claim under Title IX, even though the 
statute only explicitly prohibited sex discrimination.28 Moreover, in Sullivan v. 
Little Hunting Park, Inc., the Court held that a plaintiff could bring a 
retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which provides that “[a]ll citizens . . . 
shall have the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”29 In 
Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, the Court held the federal-sector provision of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which provides that “[a]ll 
personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment who are at 
 
 22. Id. at 58–59. 
 23. Id. at 60, 68. 
 24. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, L.P., 131 S. Ct. 863, 868–70 (2011). 
 25. This jurisprudence was a key argument in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Nassar. See infra 
Part V. Indeed, when speculating about the outcome in Nassar, one commentator noted that the 
decision would boil down to whether or not a majority of the justices would follow the line of 
decisions that label retaliation as another form of discrimination. See Kevin Russell, Argument 
Preview: Proving Retaliation Under Title VII, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 23, 2013, 5:06 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/argument-preview-proving-retaliation-under-title-vii/. 
 26. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 173–74. 
 29. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 235 n.3, 237 (1969). Thus, a white 
tenant could sue under the statute for retaliation he suffered after complaining about 
discrimination towards his black tenant. Id. at 237. 
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least 40 years of age . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on 
age,” also prohibited retaliation.30 And, in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, the 
Court determined that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which provides that “[a]ll persons 
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every 
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white 
citizens,” encompassed retaliation claims.31 
Given the relatedness of Title VII’s antidiscrimination and antiretaliation 
provisions, the extent to which the broad interpretation of retaliation 
strengthens the provision against status-based discrimination, and the history 
of Supreme Court decisions defining retaliation as another form of 
discrimination, one can easily understand Justice Ginsburg’s observation that 
“the ban on discrimination and the ban on retaliation against a discrimination 
complainant have traveled together.”32 
II.  DEVELOPMENT OF CAUSATION STANDARD UNDER TITLE VII: PRICE 
WATERHOUSE V. HOPKINS 
One continual point of contention under this framework has been the 
correct standard of causation a plaintiff must demonstrate in order to prove 
either status-based discrimination or retaliation when the employer considers 
both legitimate and illegitimate, i.e., discriminatory, reasons in making an 
employment decision.33 Fundamental to understanding the history and 
complexity of the causation standard in these so-called “mixed-motive” cases 
is the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.34 Indeed, 
Price Waterhouse may be “[o]ne of the most important cases in Title VII 
history.”35 No analysis of the Court’s decision in Nassar would be complete 
without fully examining the Court’s reasoning in Price Waterhouse. 
 
 30. Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 479 (2008) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2006)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 31. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) 
(2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 32. Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2535 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 33. This Note will deal exclusively with the causation standards under these “mixed-motive” 
cases as opposed to pretext cases. A mixed-motive claim involves a situation where the employer 
has in fact considered both illegitimate and legitimate reasons for making its employment 
decision. A pretext claim, where the employer has not taken both illegitimate and legitimate 
factors into consideration, is governed by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. 
See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 34. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 35. Lawrence D. Rosenthal, A Lack of “Motivation,” or Sound Legal Reasoning? Why Most 
Courts Are Not Applying Either Price Waterhouse’s or the 1991 Civil Rights Act’s Motivating-
Factor Analysis to Title VII Retaliation Claims in a Post-Gross World (But Should), 64 ALA. L. 
REV. 1067, 1075 (2013). “Not only did this case address burden shifting, gender stereotyping, 
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In Price, a female employee at an accounting firm sued her employer for 
sex discrimination when the firm refused to admit her as a partner.36 While 
there were “clear signs” that partners at the firm “reacted negatively to [the 
employee’s] personality because she was a woman,”37 the employer also 
introduced evidence of her lack of interpersonal skills.38 The trial judge 
concluded that even though the employer legitimately considered her lack of 
interpersonal skills in its decision to deny her partner status, the trial judge held 
that “[the employer] had unlawfully discriminated against [her] on the basis of 
sex by consciously giving credence and effect to partners’ comments that 
resulted from sex stereotyping.”39 Moreover, the judge found that because the 
employer had not demonstrated that it would have denied her partner status 
regardless of the discrimination, the employer could not avoid equitable 
relief.40 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s conclusion but determined that an employer could outright avoid Title 
VII liability if it proved “by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have 
made the same decision in the absence of discrimination.”41 
The Supreme Court, recognizing a split among the circuits, granted 
certiorari in the case to decide, in part, the proper standard of causation when 
an employer’s adverse employment decision resulted from a mixture of 
legitimate and illegitimate motives.42 Doing so required the Court to interpret 
the meaning of the words “because of” in Title VII’s provision against 
 
direct evidence, and the meaning of ‘because of,’ it was also one of several cases that led to 
Congress’s passing of the 1991 Act.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 36. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231–32. 
 37. Id. at 235 (“One partner described her as ‘macho’; another suggested that she 
‘overcompensated for being a woman’; a third advised her to take ‘a course at charm school’. 
Several partners criticized her use of profanity; in response, one partner suggested that those 
partners objected to her swearing only ‘because it’s a lady using foul language.’ . . . [I]n order to 
improve her chances for partnership, [one male partner] advised, [the female employee] should 
‘walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her 
hair styled, and wear jewelry.’” (citations omitted)). 
 38. Id. at 236. 
 39. Id. at 237. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237. Thus, while the district court found that an employer 
could avoid only equitable relief by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that it would 
have taken the same employment decision regardless of the discrimination, the D.C. Circuit 
determined that the employer could avoid liability by making that same showing. Id. 
 42. Id. at 232. The Supreme Court described the split in the lower courts that preceded its 
decision in Price Waterhouse. See id. at 238 n.2. For a more in-depth discussion of the Title VII 
causation standards before the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse, see Mark S. Brodin, 
The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982). 
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discrimination.43 Although there was no majority opinion, six of the Justices 
did agree that an employer acts “because of” a protected status when that status 
is at least a motivating or substantial factor in taking an adverse employment 
action.44 
Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of the justices, began his analysis 
by laying out the exact language of the statute and stated: “We take these 
words to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions. To 
construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for 
causation,’ . . . is to misunderstand them.”45 Moreover, Justice Brennan 
decisively determined that “because of” did not mean “solely because of,” 
citing Congress’s rejection of an amendment that would have placed the word 
“solely” before the words “because of” in the statute.46 This was demonstrative 
evidence in his eyes that Congress intended to eliminate employment decisions 
in which an illegitimate, discriminatory motive plays a part in an employment 
decision, even if it is not the sole reason for the decision.47 Thus, he concluded 
that “[w]hen . . . an employer considers both gender and legitimate factors at 
the time of making a decision, that decision was ‘because of’ sex.”48 
The Court did not end the analysis there, however. The Court went on to 
establish a burden-shifting framework, opening up the door for employers to 
claim an affirmative defense even if an employee could show that a 
discriminatory motive played a part in the employer’s decision.49 Thus, if the 
employee demonstrated that the prohibited trait was a motivating factor in the 
employment decision, the burden then shifted to the employer to demonstrate 
that it would have taken the same employment action in the absence of the 
 
 43. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240. For the full language of the statute, see supra note 
12. 
 44. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 248 (plurality opinion); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring); 
id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 45. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 (plurality opinion). 
 46. Id. at 241 n.7. 
 47. Id. at 241. In response to the dissent’s criticism of Brennan’s construction of the words 
“because of,” he stated: 
We need not leave our common sense at the doorstep when we interpret a statute. It is 
difficult for us to imagine that, in the simple words ‘because of,’ Congress meant to 
obligate a plaintiff to identify the precise causal role played by legitimate and illegitimate 
motivations in the employment decision she challenges. We conclude, instead, that 
Congress meant to obligate her to prove that the employer relied upon sex-based 
considerations in coming to its decision. 
Id. at 241–42. 
 48. Id. at 241. 
 49. Id. at 242. 
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discrimination.50 If the employer could make this showing, it would escape 
liability.51 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse, at least at first glance, 
did grant some protection to employees by allowing them to only demonstrate 
that their protected status was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.52 
However, Price Waterhouse also allowed the employer to escape all liability if 
it could demonstrate that it would have made the same decision regardless of 
the discriminatory motive.53 In the eyes of Congress, such a decision unduly 
restricted the protections guaranteed under Title VII.54 
III.  CONGRESS REACTS: CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 BUT PRICE WATERHOUSE 
SURVIVES 
A. Congress Extends Protection under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
In response to Price Waterhouse and a number of other Supreme Court 
decisions “that sharply cut back on the scope and effectiveness” of 
antidiscrimination laws,55 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the 
1991 Act).56 Indeed, the purpose of the 1991 Act was to provide “additional 
protections against unlawful discrimination in employment.”57 The 1991 Act 
codified part of the framework of Price Waterhouse and discarded the rest.58 
Specifically, the legislation added a new subsection, § 2000e-2(m), to the 
 
 50. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (White, J., concurring). 
 51. Id. Justice Brennan stated the new standard as follows: 
We hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a 
motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability 
only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same 
decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account. 
Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 2–4 (1991). 
 55. Id. Some of the other decisions overruled by the 1991 Act included Patterson v. McLean 
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 177 (1989) (holding that 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 guaranteeing all 
persons “the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens” 
does not prohibit racial harassment on the job and other forms of race discrimination occurring 
after the formation of a contract), and Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 319 (1986) 
(holding that a party prevailing in a Title VII suit against the Government was not entitled to 
interest on attorney’s fees because the provision permitting attorney’s fees did not expressly 
waive sovereign immunity). See id. 
 56. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071. For a more in-depth 
discussion on the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see Michael D. Moberly & Linda H. Miles, The 
Impact of The Civil Rights Act of 1991 on Individual Title VII Liability, 18 OKLA. CITY. U. L. 
REV. 475 (1993). 
 57. § 2, 105 Stat. at 1071. 
 58. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2). 
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section governing status-based discrimination.59 The new provision stated: 
“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining 
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice.”60 Therefore, the employee need only demonstrate that 
the prohibited status was a motivating factor in the employment decision.61 
Although the amendment saved the motivating-factor standard, the 
legislation removed the ability of the employer to escape liability by 
demonstrating that it would have made the employment decision regardless of 
any discriminatory animus.62 Instead, Congress enacted § 2000e-5(g)(2), which 
provides: 
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e–2(m) 
of this title and [the employer] demonstrates that [it] would have taken the 
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the 
court . . . may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief . . . and [limited] 
attorney’s fees and costs . . . and . . . shall not award damages or issue an order 
requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment.63 
Thus, under both Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act’s amendments, an 
employee claiming discrimination under Title VII must only demonstrate that 
the employee’s protected status was a motivating factor in the employer’s 
adverse employment decision.64 However, while an employer could avoid 
liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision 
regardless of the discrimination under Price Waterhouse, the 1991 Act’s 
amendments provided that an employer’s demonstration that it would have 
made the same decision absent a discriminatory motive would only lessen 
damages.65 
Key to the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision in Nassar was Congress’s 
decision to codify, at least in part, the decision in Price Waterhouse by adding 
the motivating-factor standards to the subsection of Title VII governing status-
based discrimination claims and not in a subsection governing Title VII 
retaliation claims or a neutral Title VII subsection governing both types of 
Title VII claims. 
 
 59. Id. § 2000e-2(m). The prohibition against retaliation is in id. § 2000e-3. 
 60. Id. § 2000e-2(m). 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2). 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2). 
 64. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241–42 (1989); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 65. Compare Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242, with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2). 
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B. Causation Standard for Retaliation Claims: Price Waterhouse or the 1991 
Act? 
After Congress enacted the 1991 Act, courts disagreed regarding which 
standard governed Title VII retaliation claims.66 Some courts applied the 1991 
Act’s motivating-factor framework, while other courts determined that the 
1991 Act did not apply and instead used the Price Waterhouse framework. 
The majority of courts continued to apply the Price Waterhouse 
framework to Title VII retaliation claims. For example, in Tanca v. Nordberg, 
the First Circuit rejected the employee’s contention that the 1991 Act’s 
motivating-factor framework applied to Title VII retaliation claims, observing 
that the 1991 Act’s motivating-factor provision did not explicitly refer to 
retaliation claims.67 Thus, the court determined that Price Waterhouse still 
applied to Title VII retaliation claims.68 
Some courts, however, did begin to apply the 1991 Act’s motivating-factor 
framework to Title VII retaliation claims, though these cases lacked a clear 
analysis of why the 1991 Act applied. For example, the Seventh Circuit 
appeared to suggest in Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc. that the 1991 Act’s 
motivating-framework governed Title VII retaliation claims, but the court 
never engaged in a thorough analysis regarding the 1991 Act’s applicability 
versus Price Waterhouse’s applicability.69 
IV.  CAUSATION REVISITED: GROSS V. FBL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. 
A. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. and the Resurgence of But-For 
Causation 
The Supreme Court, in deciding Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,70 
added another wrinkle to the already confusing area of causation standards in 
retaliation claims. In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that plaintiffs claiming 
discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(ADEA) must show that age was the “but-for” cause of the employer’s adverse 
employment action.71 
 
 66. For a more in-depth analysis of the circuit split following the 1991 Act, see Rosenthal, 
supra note 35, at 1069–73. 
 67. Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680, 680–82 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 68. Id. at 683. 
 69. Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 892–94 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 70. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
 71. Id. at 169–70, 177. The relevant provision of the ADEA provides: “It shall be unlawful 
for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006). 
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In Gross, the plaintiff-employee had worked for the defendant-employer 
for about thirty years when he was given the position of claims administrator in 
2001.72 Two years later, when the employee was fifty-four years old, the 
company restructured the employee’s job and transferred many of his job 
responsibilities to a newly created position held by a younger employee.73 The 
employer asserted various legitimate reasons for the restructuring of the 
employee’s position,74 but the employee, viewing his new position as a 
demotion, filed suit against the employer for violating the ADEA.75 
At the close of trial, the trial court instructed the jury to find for the 
employee if he had demonstrated that his age had been a motivating factor in 
the employer’s decision to demote him.76 The trial court further instructed, 
however, that the jury must find for the employer if it had proven that it would 
have made the same decision regardless of the employee’s age.77 The jury 
returned a verdict for the employee, and the employer appealed.78 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, construing the 
appropriate standards of Price Waterhouse, found that the trial court had not 
given the proper jury instructions.79 Specifically, the Eighth Circuit determined 
that under Price Waterhouse, the employee must present direct evidence 
demonstrating that his age actually motivated the adverse employment 
 
 72. Gross, 557 U.S. at 170. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. At trial, the employer defended its position by providing evidence that the 
employee’s transfer to the new position was part of an overall corporate restructuring and that the 
new position was better suited to the employee’s skills. Id. 
 75. Id. Although Gross dealt with a discrimination claim under the ADEA and not Title VII, 
courts deciding cases involving retaliation claims under Title VII after Gross was decided used 
Gross to establish a but-for causation standard for the retaliation claims as well. See infra Part IV-
B. Moreover, the Supreme Court used the reasoning in Gross when deciding Nassar. See infra 
Part V. 
 76. Id. at 170–71. 
 77. Gross, 557 U.S. at 171. The instructions, in part, were as follows: 
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if all the following elements have been proved by the 
preponderance of the evidence: . . . [The] plaintiff’s age was a motivating factor in 
defendant’s decision to demote plaintiff. However, your verdict must be for defendant . . . 
if it has been proved by the preponderance of the evidence that defendant would have 
demoted plaintiff regardless of his age. . . . As used in these instructions, plaintiff’s age 
was a motivating factor, if plaintiff’s age played a part or a role in the defendant’s 
decision to demote plaintiff. However, plaintiff’s age need not have been the only reason 
for defendant’s decision to demote plaintiff. 
Id. at 192 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). To compare this 
instruction with the standards in Price Waterhouse, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228, 258 (1989). 
 78. Gross, 557 U.S. at 171 (majority opinion). 
 79. Id. 
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decision.80 Absent such a showing, the burden never shifted to the employer to 
demonstrate that it would have taken the same decision regardless of the 
discrimination.81 Thus, because the trial court’s instructions allowed the burden 
to shift to the employer upon the employee presenting any category of 
evidence showing his age was a motivating factor, the trial improperly 
construed Price Waterhouse.82 Moreover, because the employee conceded that 
he had not presented any direct evidence, the Eighth Circuit determined that 
the trial court should not have even given the mixed-motive instruction but 
should have instead instructed the jury “only to determine whether [the 
employee] had carried his burden of ‘prov[ing] that age was the determining 
factor in FBL’s employment action.’”83 The employee appealed, and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.84 
Although the Court acknowledged that “[t]he question presented by the 
petitioner in this case is whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of age 
discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motives jury instruction in a suit 
brought under the [ADEA],”85 the Court instead decided to answer whether a 
mixed-motive instruction is even allowed in ADEA discrimination cases, 
noting that it could not answer the former question without having answered 
the latter question.86 The Court began by stating that “Title VII is materially 
different with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion,” and, therefore, 
 
 80. Id. at 172. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Gross, 557 U.S. at 172–73 (citation omitted). 
 84. Id. at 173. 
 85. Id. at 169–70. 
 86. Id. at 173. “Although the parties did not specifically frame the question to include this 
threshold inquiry, ‘[t]he statement of any question presented is deemed to comprise every 
subsidiary question fairly included therein.’” Id. at 173 n.1 (citation omitted). The dissent was 
particularly disturbed by the “majority’s inattention to prudential Court practices” in even 
answering the mixed-motive instruction question, stating: 
The Court asks whether a mixed-motives instruction is ever appropriate in an ADEA case. 
As it acknowledges, this was not the question we granted certiorari to decide. Instead, the 
question arose for the first time in respondent’s brief, which asked us to “overrule Price 
Waterhouse with respect to its application to the ADEA.” In the usual course, this Court 
would not entertain such a request raised only in a merits brief: “We would normally 
expect notice of an intent to make so far-reaching an argument in the respondent’s 
opposition to a petition for certiorari, thereby assuring adequate preparation time for those 
likely affected and wishing to participate.” Yet the Court is unconcerned that the question 
it chooses to answer has not been briefed by the parties or interested amici curiae. Its 
failure to consider the views of the United States, which represents the agency charged 
with administering the ADEA, is especially irresponsible. 
Id. at 181 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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decisions that construe Title VII, including Price Waterhouse, do not control 
its construction of the ADEA.87 The Court continued: 
This Court has never held that this burden-shifting framework applies to 
ADEA claims. And, we decline to do so now. When conducting statutory 
interpretation, we “must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one 
statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination.” Unlike 
Title VII, the ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish 
discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor.88 
Moreover, the Court noted that while Congress amended Title VII to 
provide for a motivating-factor standard, it neglected to add a similar provision 
to the ADEA, even though it chose to amend the ADEA in other ways at the 
same time.89 The Court determined that it could not “ignore” Congress’s 
decision to not add the motivating-factor provision to the ADEA, reasoning, 
“When Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is 
presumed to have acted intentionally.”90 
Having established that cases construing Title VII did not apply in this 
context, the Court turned to the actual text of the ADEA and, as it did in Price 
Waterhouse, narrowed in on the meaning of the words “because of.”91 This 
time, however, after examining dictionary definitions of the word “because,” 
the Court determined that “because of” means “[b]y reason of; on account of,” 
and, therefore, that “the ordinary meaning of the ADEA’s requirement that an 
employer took adverse action ‘because of’ age is that age was the ‘reason’ that 
the employer decided to act.”92 Given the “ordinary meaning” of the ADEA’s 
provision, the Court concluded that the plaintiff must establish that age was the 
but-for cause of the employer’s adverse action in order to prevail on an ADEA 
discrimination claim.93 
The Court concluded by rejecting the employee’s argument that Price 
Waterhouse controlled the Court’s interpretation, arguing that the Price 
 
 87. Id. at 173 (majority opinion). 
 88. Gross, 557 U.S. at 174 (citing Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 
(2008)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 176. 
 92. Id. Justice Stevens criticized the majority’s new interpretation: 
We were no doubt aware that dictionaries define “because of” as “by reason of” or “on 
account of.” Contrary to the majority’s bald assertion, however, this does not establish 
that the term denotes but-for causation. The dictionaries the Court cites do not, for 
instance, define “because of” as “solely by reason of” or “exclusively on account of.” In 
Price Waterhouse, we recognized that the words “because of” do not mean “solely 
because of,” and we held that the inquiry “commanded by the words” of the statute was 
whether gender was a motivating factor in the employment decision. 
Id. at 183 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 93. Gross, 557 U.S. at 177 (majority opinion). 
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Waterhouse approach was difficult to apply and may not even be doctrinally 
sound.94 Thus, the Court concluded: 
We hold that a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the 
ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the “but-
for” cause of the challenged adverse employment action. The burden of 
persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the 
action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence 
that age was one motivating factor in that decision.95 
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, focused his argument on the Court’s 
analysis in Price Waterhouse, noting that it construed the identical “because 
of” language of Title VII to imply that the text “proscribes adverse 
employment actions motived in whole or in part by the age of the employee.”96 
He further chastised the majority for interpreting the words “because of” under 
the ADEA “as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for’ causation,” an interpretation 
the Court in Price Waterhouse had squarely rejected.97 Moreover, Justice 
Stevens rejected the notion that cases construing Title VII had no weight to the 
case at hand, stating, “The relevant language in the two statutes is identical, 
and we have long recognized that our interpretations of Title VII’s language 
apply with equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the substantive 
provisions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII.”98 
Justice Stevens also reasoned that Congress’s reaction to Price 
Waterhouse, in enacting the 1991 Act, actually supported the notion that 
“because of” should not be interpreted to mean “but-for causation,” noting that 
Congress actually codified Price Waterhouse’s motivating-factor standard and 
rejected the but-for causation standard advocated by Price Waterhouse’s 
dissent.99 Therefore, according to Justice Stevens, given that courts have 
consistently held that Title VII cases apply to cases involving the ADEA, even 
if the motivating-factor standard within the 1991 Act’s amendments to Title 
 
 94. Id. at 178–79. Interestingly, in his dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the “but-for” 
causation standard was not free of its own defects in the employment context, noting: “In a case 
where we characterize an employer’s actions as having been taken out of multiple motives . . . to 
apply ‘but-for’ causation is to engage in a hypothetical inquiry about what would have happened 
if the employer’s thoughts and other circumstances had been different.” Id. at 191 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). For a more in depth discussion of Justice Breyer’s critique of the but-for standard, see 
infra Part VI. 
 95. Id. at 180 (majority opinion). 
 96. Id. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. at 183. 
 98. Gross, 557 U.S. at 183 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)). 
 99. Id. at 185. Justice Steven’s later stated, “The Court’s resurrection of the but-for causation 
standard is unwarranted. Price Waterhouse repudiated that standard 20 years ago, and Congress’ 
response to our decision further militates against the crabbed interpretation the Court adopts 
today.” Id. at 187. 
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VII may not apply to the ADEA,100 the Price Waterhouse interpretation of 
“because of” should still govern.101 
B. Causation in Title VII Retaliation Claims After Gross: Gross, Price 
Waterhouse, or the  1991 Act? 
The Gross decision was met with some contempt.102 In fact, a bill was 
introduced in Congress to overturn Gross.103 The bill, Protecting Older 
Workers Against Discrimination Act, was never enacted,104 however, and 
courts were left to interpret how far-reaching of an effect the majority’s 
analysis in Gross would have on retaliation claims under Title VII. 
Although Gross construed the ADEA, many courts began to apply Gross 
in the Title VII context. In fact, the majority of courts faced with Title VII 
retaliation claims used Gross to hold that Title VII required the employee to 
demonstrate that his protected activity was the but-for cause of the employer’s 
adverse employment action.105 
The minority approach taken by the courts after Gross was decided was to 
apply Price Waterhouse to retaliation claims. For example, in Smith v. Xerox 
Corporation, the Fifth Circuit rejected the contention that Gross required the 
court to adopt a but-for causation standard for Title VII retaliation claims.106 
The Fifth Circuit argued that Gross did not apply because it involved the 
ADEA and not Title VII.107 Thus, the court relied on Price Waterhouse to 
determine that the employee only had to show that her protected activity was a 
 
 100. The dissent noted that there may actually be good reason to think that the 1991 
amendments to Title VII should apply to the ADEA as well: 
There is, however, some evidence that Congress intended the 1991 mixed-motives 
amendments to apply to the ADEA as well. See H.R. Rep., pt. 2, at 4 (noting that a 
“number of other laws banning discrimination, including . . . the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., are modeled after and have been 
interpreted in a manner consistent with Title VII,” and that “these other laws modeled 
after Title VII [should] be interpreted consistently in a manner consistent with Title VII as 
amended by this Act,” including the mixed-motives provisions). 
Id. at 186 n.6. 
 101. Id. at 186–87. 
 102. See, e.g., Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard in Federal Employment Law 
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 69 (2010) (responding to the Gross decision). 
 103. See Andrew Kenny, The Meaning of “Because” in Employment Discrimination Law: 
Causation in Title VII Retaliation Cases After Gross, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1031, 1032–33 (2011) 
(discussing the proposed amendment). 
 104. Id. 
 105. For a discussion of the cases that used Gross to establish a but-for causation standard for 
Title VII retaliation claims, see Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1100–05. 
 106. Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 328 (5th Cir. 2010). Nassar also came out of the 
Fifth Circuit. 
 107. Id. at 329. 
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motivating factor in the employer’s adverse employment action.108 If the 
employee made that showing, the Fifth Circuit determined, the employer could 
then avoid liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same 
decision absent the retaliatory motive.109 Judge Jolly dissented, arguing that 
Gross controlled and that the proper standard for retaliation claims was the 
but-for causation.110 
Only three years after Smith was decided, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Nassar to resolve the split and decide the proper standard of 
causation for Title VII retaliation claims. 
V.  UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER V. NASSAR 
A. Facts of University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar 
The University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (“University”) is an 
academic institution which specializes in medical education.111 In an effort to 
give its students hands-on experience at healthcare facilities, the University 
had affiliated itself with a number of hospitals, including Parkland Memorial 
Hospital (“Hospital”).112 The affiliation agreement between the University and 
the Hospital provided that the Hospital would offer the University’s faculty 
members empty staff physician positions at the Hospital.113 Under this 
framework, Naiel Nassar, a doctor of Middle Eastern descent, was hired to 
work both as an assistant professor at the University and as a staff physician in 
the infectious disease division of the Hospital.114 
In 2004, Dr. Beth Levine became Nassar’s ultimate supervisor when she 
was hired as the University’s Chief of Infectious Disease Medicine.115 After 
being hired, Levine began criticizing Nassar’s billing practices and 
productivity and made comments to the effect that “Middle Easterners are 
 
 108. Id. at 330. 
 109. Id. at 333. 
 110. Id. at 336 (Jolly, J., dissenting). Judge Jolly stated: 
[T]he majority effectively creates an unnecessary split in the circuits by failing properly to 
apply the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. As the Seventh 
Circuit has correctly reasoned, without statutory language indicating otherwise, the 
mixed-motive analysis is no longer applicable outside of Title VII discrimination, and 
consequently does not apply to this retaliation case. 
Id. 
 111. Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. Nassar was first employed in 1995 but resigned his positions in 1998 to attend more 
schooling. Id. In 2001, he was rehired to work again as both a faculty member and staff 
physician. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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lazy.”116 Nassar felt that Levine’s actions were a result of a bias against him 
because of his religion and ethnicity.117 After meeting several times to 
complain of Levine’s harassment with Dr. Gregory Fitz, the University’s Chair 
of Internal Medicine, Nassar began to consider ways to continue to work at the 
Hospital without being subject to Levine’s supervision.118 To this end, Nassar 
inquired whether the Hospital would be willing to employ him regardless of 
whether he was a faculty member of the University.119 When the Hospital 
indicated it would, Nassar resigned his position at the University and, in a 
letter to Fitz, cited Levine’s harassment and discrimination as the catalyst for 
his resignation.120 
Fitz, having expressed his concern over the humiliation the letter had 
caused Levine and the need to “publicly exonerat[e]” her, appealed to the 
Hospital to rescind its offer of employment to Nassar.121 Fitz argued that the 
affiliation agreement required the Hospital to offer staff positions to University 
faculty, and, as such, any offer to Nassar was barred by the agreement.122 In 
response to the opposition, the Hospital withdrew its offer of employment.123 
B. Procedural Posture 
As a result of these events, Nassar filed a suit in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Texas.124 Nassar alleged that Levine’s 
harassment led to his constructive discharge, and, thus, the University had 
discriminated against him on the basis of his race, religion, and national 
origin—a status-based discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a) of Title VII.125 
Nassar further alleged that the University had retaliated against him for 
complaining about Levine’s harassment—a retaliation claim under § 2000e-
3(a) of Title VII.126 After a trial, the jury found for Nassar on both the status-
based and retaliation claims, awarding him $400,000 in backpay and over $3 
 
 116. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 2523–24. 
 120. Id. at 2524. The letter read in part: 
The primary reason of my resignation is the continuing harassment and discrimination 
against me by the Infectious Diseases division chief, Dr. Beth Levine . . . . I have been 
threatened with denial of promotion, loss of salary support and potentially loss of my 
job[.] . . . [This treatment] stems from [Levine’s] religious, racial and cultural bias against 
Arabs and Muslims that has resulted in a hostile work environment. 
Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 121. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524. 
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million in compensatory damages.127 The district court reduced the 
compensatory damages to $300,000 and entered judgment.128 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part 
and vacated in part.129 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found that Nassar had not 
demonstrated sufficient evidence that Levine’s harassment and discrimination 
resulted in his constructive discharge.130 Thus, the Fifth Circuit vacated the 
entry of judgment in favor of Nassar on the status-based discrimination 
claim.131 The Fifth Circuit, however, affirmed the decision in favor of Nassar 
on the retaliation claim.132 The Fifth Circuit first noted that the required proof 
for a Title VII retaliation claim is less demanding than a constructive discharge 
claim.133 The Fifth Circuit then qualified that its review was limited. 
Specifically, the court observed that it only needed to determine that “the 
record contains sufficient evidence . . . that [the employer’s] stated reason for 
[taking adverse employment action against the employee] was pretext or that, 
while true, was only one reason for their being fired, and race was another 
motivating factor.”134 Thus, even though the University argued that “Fitz 
thwarted Nassar’s prospective employment at Parkland as a routine application 
of [its] rights under [its] affiliation agreement,” the Fifth Circuit found that 
Nassar had offered sufficient proof that a motivating factor in Fitz’s opposition 
of the offer of employment was Nassar’s complaint about Levine.135 
Importantly, the University had argued in its Brief on Appeal that the 
district court erred in instructing the jury on a mixed-motive theory of 
retaliation.136 Instead of addressing the argument in the text of its opinion, 
however, the Fifth Circuit devoted only three sentences to the argument in a 
footnote, stating the mixed-motive causation argument was foreclosed by its 
decision in Smith.137 
The University subsequently filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en 
banc.138 In the opinion denying the petition for rehearing and rehearing en 
banc, some of the Fifth Circuit judges outlined their views regarding the 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 130. Id. at 453. 
 131. Id. at 456. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 454. 
 134. Nassar, 674 F.3d at 454 (emphasis added). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 456 n.16. 
 137. Id. The footnote read in part, “UTSW also urges error based on the jury having been 
instructed on a mixed-motive theory of retaliation. UTSW concedes that its argument is 
foreclosed by our decision in Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 330 (5th Cir.2010). We 
therefore find no error in the jury instructions.” Id. 
 138. See Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 688 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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causation argument.139 Specifically, Judge Elrod, in her concurring opinion, 
argued that the University had waived the mixed-motive causation argument at 
the trial level.140 In a dissenting opinion, however, Judge Smith vehemently 
argued that the Fifth Circuit should overturn the decision in Smith because it 
was an erroneous interpretation of the statute regarding the causation 
standard.141 In his opinion, the case presented the perfect vehicle to resolve the 
conflict regarding the appropriate causation standard for retaliation claims 
under Title VII.142 
The University then filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.143 The 
Supreme Court must have agreed with Judge Smith that Nassar represented the 
perfect vehicle to resolve the conflict, as it granted certiorari on January 18, 
2013.144 
C. Majority Opinion 
1. The Motivating-Factor Provision Does Not Apply to Retaliation 
Claims 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, began the analysis by discussing 
the ordinary but-for standard for causation found in usual tort claims.145 
Because the ordinary but-for standard is the “background against which 
Congress legislated in enacting Title VII,” the Court presumed that Congress 
intended to incorporate the usual causation standard “absent an indication to 
the contrary in the statute itself.”146 
Having determined the proper framework, the Court then proceeded to 
discuss the judicial and legislative attempts to define the causation requirement 
under Title VII, including its decision in Price Waterhouse and Congress’s 
response in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.147 In discussing the 1991 Act’s 
addition of § 2000e-2(m) to Title VII, the Court admitted that Congress clearly 
legislated the proper standard for status-based discrimination claims under 
§2000e-2.148 Thus, status-based discrimination claims under Title VII are in 
fact governed by the lesser causation standard that requires the employee to 
 
 139. Id. at 211–12. 
 140. Id. at 212 (Elrod, J., concurring). Judge Elrod found that the University had failed to 
raise a timely objection to the jury instruction and that the University had originally drafted its 
own jury instruction to include a motivating-factor standard. Id. at 211. 
 141. Id. at 212–13 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. at 213. 
 143. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 978, 979 (2013). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524–25 (2013). 
 146. Id. at 2525. 
 147. Id. at 2525–26. 
 148. Id. at 2526. 
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show that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was only a motivating 
factor in the employment action.149 
The Court next discussed its decision in Gross, noting that while Gross 
arose under the ADEA and not Title VII, the “particular confines of Gross 
[did] not deprive it of all persuasive force.”150 In fact, the Court stated that 
Gross provided “two insights” as it interpreted the term “because” in relation 
to causation and it demonstrated the significance of the structural choices in 
Title VII and the 1991 Act’s provisions.151 
With this background in mind, the Court proceeded to analyze whether the 
1991 Act’s amendments to Title VII establishing the proper standard of 
causation for status-based claims also applied to retaliation claims under Title 
VII.152 The Court concluded that it did not and instead decided that, “[g]iven 
the lack of any meaningful textual difference between the text in [Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision] and the [statute] in Gross, the proper conclusion, as in 
Gross, is that Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to 
retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.”153 
The Court then focused on dispelling the contention that Title VII 
retaliation claims should be governed by the motivating-factor standard in § 
2000e-2(m) and treated the same as Title VII status-based discrimination 
claims, arguing that: (1) the plain language of § 2000e-2(m) applied only to 
status-based discrimination claims, (2) the design and structure of § 2000e-
2(m) demonstrated that it applied only to status-based discrimination claims, 
and (3) there was no general rule that the Court treats bans on status-based 
discrimination as bans on retaliation when interpreting federal 
antidiscrimination laws.154 
The Court first argued that the “plain language” of § 2000e-2(m) did not 
support an assertion that it applied to retaliation claims.155 Despite the fact that 
§ 2000e-2(m) began by stating “an unlawful unemployment practice is 
established when,” and Title VII defined retaliation as an unlawful 
employment practice, the Court stated that § 2000e-2(m) did not actually 
extend to all unlawful employment practices under Title VII.156 Because § 
 
 149. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
 150. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2527. 
 151. Id. at 2527–28. 
 152. Id. at 2529. See supra Part III (discussing the 1991 Act and its amendments to Title VII). 
 153. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528. See supra notes 15 and 71 for the full text of these 
provisions. 
 154. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528–29. 
 155. Id. at 2528. 
 156. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). As stated previously, the full text of this 
provision is as follows: “[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining 
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for 
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Id. 
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2000e-2(m) also referred to the status-based discrimination actions, the Court 
concluded that the reference represented “Congress’ intent to confine that 
provision’s coverage to only those types of employment practices.”157 Thus, 
even though the beginning of the provision applied to “an” unlawful 
unemployment practice, because the statute did not outright state that it applied 
to retaliation, the Court found it would be “improper to conclude that what 
Congress omitted from the statute is nevertheless within its scope.”158 
The Court next argued that interpreting § 2000e-2(m) as applying to Title 
VII retaliation claims would ignore Congress’s ability to design the provision 
and choose its structure.159 Congress’s choice in structuring a statute should be 
presumed to be deliberate, the Court argued, and, thus, by including § 2000e-
2(m) in the section prohibiting status-based discrimination and not in the 
section prohibiting retaliation or in a section that exclusively applied to both 
claims, Congress intended § 2000e-2(m) to only apply to status-based 
discrimination claims.160 Further, the Court found it relevant that a different 
portion of the 1991 Act contained an express reference to all unlawful 
employment actions.161 If it wanted the motivating-factor standard to apply to 
both status-based and retaliation claims, the Court argued, Congress would 
have used the same express language.162 
In its last refutation to the claim that § 2000e-2(m) applied to retaliation 
claims, the Court addressed the argument that its precedent treated prohibitions 
against status-based discrimination as a general prohibition against retaliation 
as well when interpreting federal anti-discrimination statutes.163 Though the 
Court admitted that its decisions in CBOCS, Gomez, and Jackson stated “the 
general proposition that Congress’s enactment of a broadly phrased 
antidiscrimination statute may signal a concomitant intent to ban retaliation . . . 
even where the statute does not refer to retaliation in so many words,” the 
Court determined that those cases were not controlling because the laws in 
those cases were broad general bans on discrimination while Title VII was a 
precise, complex, and exhaustive statute.164 In other words, “[the] fundamental 
difference in statutory structure render[ed] inapposite decisions which treated 
 
 157. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 2529. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. (“The relevant portion of the 1991 Act, § 109(b), allowed certain overseas operations 
by U.S. employers to engage in ‘any practice prohibited by section 703 or 704,’ i.e., § 2000e–2 or 
§ 2000e–3, ‘if compliance with such section would cause such employer . . . to violate the law of 
the foreign country in which such workplace is located.” (citation omitted)). 
 162. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2529. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 2530. 
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retaliation as an implicit corollary of status-based discrimination.”165 
Therefore, in the Court’s estimation, references to status-based discrimination 
were not always to be treated as synonyms for retaliation.166 
2. Need of Judicial Resources Demands a Stricter Standard for 
Retaliation Claims 
In support of its decision to apply the stricter but-for standard to retaliation 
claims under Title VII, the Court next launched into a judicial efficiency 
argument.167 In the Court’s view, the proper interpretation of the causation 
standard for retaliation claims had “central importance” to the fair and 
responsible allocation of judicial resources, especially given the growth of 
retaliation claims in recent years.168 Citing Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) statistics as evidence of this growth, the Court noted that 
the number of retaliation claims exceeded those for every type of status-based 
discrimination except race.169 Thus, if the Court allowed a motiving-factor 
standard, the number of frivolous claims could increase and divert resources 
away from genuine efforts to combat discrimination.170 
3. Refusal to Give Deference to EEOC or Price 
Even though the EEOC guidelines clearly stated that retaliation claims 
could be shown using the lesser motivating-factor standard, the Court refused 
to give the EEOC’s interpretation deference because, in the Court’s opinion, 
the EEOC’s explanations for its interpretation of the proper causation standard 
for retaliation claims “lack the persuasive force that is a necessary precondition 
to deference.”171 The EEOC had first defended its interpretation on the theory 
that retaliation claims had consistently been governed under the same 
causation standard as status-based discrimination claims, stating “Courts have 
long held that the evidentiary framework for proving [status-based] 
discrimination . . . also applies to claims of discrimination based on 
retaliation.”172 The Court rejected this explanation, however, noting that it 
failed “to address the particular interplay among the status-based 
discrimination provision (§ 2000e–2(a)), the antiretaliation provision (§ 
2000e–3(a)), and the motivating-factor provision (§ 2000e–2(m)).”173 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 2530–31. 
 167. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 2531–32. 
 171. Id. at 2533. 
 172. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533. For further understanding of the EEOC’s position, see 2 
EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 8(E)(1) (May 20, 1998). 
 173. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
920 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:897 
The EEOC’s second explanation for its interpretation was that “an 
interpretation . . . that permits proven retaliation to go unpunished undermines 
the purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions of maintaining unfettered access 
to the statutory remedial mechanism.”174 The Court rejected this explanation as 
well, however, stating that the reasoning was “circular” because it assumed 
what causal relationship must be shown in order to prove retaliation.175 
Finally, the Court refused to apply the Price Waterhouse standard, even 
though the Court admitted that the case expressly interpreted causation under 
Title VII.176 In the Court’s estimation, Congress displaced the entire Price 
Waterhouse standard when it adopted the 1991 Act’s amendments to Title 
VII.177 Further, the Court found that applying Price Waterhouse would be 
inconsistent with Gross’s interpretation of the word “because.”178 
D. Dissent Disagrees 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, began 
her dissent by also describing the two different types of discrimination under 
Title VII—status-based claims and retaliation claims.179 Instead of sweepingly 
discussing the two claims as the majority did, however, Ginsburg set out the 
statutory language which created each claim and made a point to emphasize 
the similarity in the language of both subsections.180 Specifically, Ginsburg 
emphasized that both subsections made it an unlawful employment practice to 
discriminate against an employee because of certain protected traits or 
activities.181 In doing so, Ginsburg set the foundation for her argument: status-
based discrimination and retaliation claims were “twin safeguards” that should 
require the same causation standard.182 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 2533–34. 
 176. Id. at 2534. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534. 
 179. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 180. Id. Justice Ginsburg puts her own emphasis on the word “because” in both subsections. 
Thus, she states: 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . makes it an ‘“unlawful employment practice” 
to “discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.” § 2000e–2(a) (emphasis added). Backing up that core 
provision, Title VII also makes it an “unlawful employment practice” to discriminate 
against any individual “because” the individual has complained of, opposed, or 
participated in a proceeding about, prohibited discrimination. § 2000e–3(a) (emphasis 
added). 
Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 2535. 
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1. History of Treating Status-Based Claims and Retaliation Claims 
Together 
Ginsburg first noted that the two Title VII claims had “traveled 
together”—plaintiffs often raised the two claims in tandem and the Court had 
regularly interpreted them similarly.183 Indeed, in Ginsburg’s estimation, by 
establishing a rule that “drives a wedge between” the two claims, the majority 
decision broke with the principle that the Supreme Court’s Title VII 
jurisprudence made clear: “Retaliation for complaining about discrimination is 
tightly bonded to the core prohibition and cannot be disassociated from it. 
Indeed, [the Supreme] Court has explained again and again that ‘retaliation in 
response to a complaint about [proscribed] discrimination is 
discrimination.’”184 
Specifically, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Supreme Court precedent 
supported the “symbiotic relationship” between the prohibition against 
discrimination and the prohibition against retaliation.185 Prohibitions against 
rehabilitation, she noted, helped reinforce the purpose of prohibitions against 
status-based discrimination by making sure that employers did not unlawfully 
interfere with an individual’s efforts to secure the protections afforded them 
under such status-based prohibitions.186 Without protections from retaliation, 
the antidiscrimination provisions within Title VII have no real sting, as 
employees would not feel free to air their grievances.187 Thus, she argued, 
effective enforcement of proscriptions on status-based discrimination depended 
on a strong and effective proscription on retaliation.188 
Given the relationship between status-based discrimination and retaliation, 
Ginsburg noted that the Supreme Court had consistently held—until the 
majority’s decision in Nassar—that a ban on discrimination encompassed 
retaliation.189 In supporting her claim, Ginsburg examined the different cases 
that unequivocally established that retaliation was discrimination; she then 
 
 183. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 2537. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. In other words, if employees bear a heavy burden in establishing a violation of the 
retaliation provision, employees will be less likely to speak up regarding discrimination. Thus, 
requiring a tougher but-for causation standard for retaliation claims will have the effect of 
actually lessening the force of a strong prohibition against discrimination. Therefore, applying the 
same standard of causation for both retaliation and status-based claims actually comports with the 
purpose of the act in protecting against discrimination. Such protection, furthermore, was the 
intent with which Congress enacted the motivating-factor standard in the 1991 Act. See infra Part 
VI. 
 188. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2537 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 189. Id. 
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concluded that there was no “sound reason” to stray from the precedent 
established in those cases.190 
Beyond discussing the Supreme Court precedent that had consistently 
treated retaliation as a form of discrimination, Justice Ginsburg also argued 
that legislative intent regarding the codification of the motivating-factor 
causation standard also demonstrated that claims for retaliation and claims for 
status-based discrimination were designed to be tested under the same 
analysis.191 As Justice Ginsburg noted, the 1991 Amendment was intended to 
add additional protections against discrimination and to respond to Supreme 
Court decisions that had limited the effectiveness of the antidiscrimination 
laws.192 One such decision that Congress was concerned about was Price 
Waterhouse, as the Supreme Court had concluded that an employer could 
avoid liability under Title VII by demonstrating that it would have taken the 
same employment action regardless of the discriminatory motive.193 In Justice 
Ginsburg’s eyes, Congress had actually endorsed the Court’s finding in Price 
Waterhouse that the discrimination need only be a motivating factor in an 
adverse employment decision in order for an employer to be liable under Title 
VII; Congress detested, however, the provision of Price Waterhouse that 
allowed an employer to avoid liability by demonstrating that it would have 
made the decision regardless of the discrimination.194 
Thus, Congress made clear that its amendment was designed to establish a 
motivating-factor standard for discrimination claims—an attempt, Justice 
Ginsburg noted, to “restore” the rule several courts had followed that placed 
liability on employers when discrimination actually played a role in making an 
adverse employment decision.195 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that 
the rule Congress attempted to restore had been applied to both status-based 
claims and retaliation claims under Title VII.196 In fact, the Congressional 
Report discussing the amendment cited with approval the decision in Bibbs v. 
Block, which held that an employer violated Title VII when an unlawful 
motive played some party in the employment decision.197 The holdings of 
Biggs, even before the enactment of the 1991 Act, had been applied to 
establish claims of retaliation, not just claims of status-based discrimination.198 
Thus, given the clear congressional intent to strengthen the protections of Title 
VII and its approval of decisions applying the motivating-factor standard to 
 
 190. Id. at 2537–38. 
 191. See id. at 2539. 
 192. Id. 2538. 
 193. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2538. 
 194. Id. at 2539. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id.; Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323–24 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
 198. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2539 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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claims of retaliation, Justice Ginsburg concluded that there was “scant reason 
to think that . . . Congress meant to exclude retaliation claims from the newly 
enacted ‘motivating factor’ provision.”199 
Moreover, in Justice Ginsburg’s estimation, the placement of the provision 
that the majority found to be conclusive evidence of Congress’s intent to limit 
the motivating-factor standard to status-based discrimination claims may not 
have been so conclusive after all.200 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg argued that by 
not placing the framework in a provision that dealt specifically and exclusively 
with status-based discrimination claims, Congress actually made clear that the 
new provision was not limited to status-based claims.201 Further evidence that 
Congress intended the provision to apply equally to both claims, Justice 
Ginsburg argued, was that the new provision clearly stated that it encompassed 
“any employment practice.”202 
2. Implications of the Majority’s Decision 
As noted earlier, Ginsburg also took aim at the majority’s decision by 
noting its total lack of forethought to the effect it would have on trial judges 
left to figure out how to properly determine violations of the prohibition 
against retaliation, especially given the fact that retaliation claims were almost 
always joined by claims of status-based discrimination.203 In Ginsburg’s own 
words, “[t]he Court shows little regard for the trial judges who will be obliged 
to charge discrete causation standards when a claim of discrimination ‘because 
of,’ e.g., race is coupled with a claim of discrimination ‘because’ the individual 
has complained of race discrimination.”204 Indeed, even jurors “will puzzle 
over the rhyme or reason for the dual standards.”205 
Of “graver concern” to Ginsburg, however, was the effect the Court had on 
a provision designed to strengthen Title VII protections, not limit them.206 
Ginsburg lamented that “the Court has seized on a provision . . . adopted by 
Congress as part of an endeavor to strengthen Title VII, and turned it into a 
measure reducing the force of the ban on retaliation.”207 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 2539–40. 
 201. Id. at 2539. 
 202. Id. (citation omitted). 
 203. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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 207. Id. 
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VI.  ANALYSIS: THE MOTIVATING-FACTOR STANDARD SHOULD GOVERN 
RETALIATION CLAIMS 
The Supreme Court, in granting certiorari in Nassar, had the chance to 
solidify and strengthen the relationship between Title VII’s status-based 
discrimination statue and its retaliation statute. Instead of determining that 
retaliation claims can be proven under the lesser motivating-factor framework 
allowed for status-based discrimination claims, however, the Court 
unnecessarily differentiated between the two types of discrimination and held 
that retaliation claims must proceed under the but-for causation standard.208 In 
doing so, the Court unduly burdened employees and created a pointless hurdle 
to succeeding on Title VII retaliation claims. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
should have allowed Title VII retaliation claims to enjoy the same motiving-
factor causation standard that governs status-based discrimination claims under 
Title VII. 
Specifically, the Court in Nassar reached the wrong result for the 
following three reasons: 1) the majority’s reasoning rested on incomplete and 
unfounded conclusions, 2) the but-for causation standard will be difficult to 
prove and even harder for jurors to apply, and 3) the purpose and policy behind 
Title VII’s antiretaliation statute call for a lesser causation standard. 
A. The Majority’s Reasoning Was Incomplete and Unfounded 
1. “Because of” Does Not Require But-For Causation 
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, “because of,” at least as it is used in 
Title VII’s antidiscrimination and antiretaliation statutes, does not mean 
“solely because of.” Instead of looking to cues from Congress to help interpret 
the language of the statute, the majority looked to Gross and its reliance on 
dictionary definitions in determining what Congress meant when it used the 
words “because of” in Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.209 In the process, 
the majority ignored the clear indication that “because of” does not require a 
but-for causation standard. Indeed, as Justice Brennan noted when the Supreme 
Court first interpreted Title VII’s use of the words “because of” in Price 
Waterhouse, Congress clearly did not want the words “because of” to be 
construed to mean “solely because of,” as it rejected an amendment that would 
have placed the word “solely” in front of the words “because of.”210 In fact, the 
 
 208. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534 (majority opinion). 
 209. Id. at 2527. 
 210. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 n.7 (1989). One scholar, writing before 
Price Waterhouse was decided, discussed the legislative history of Title VII and found the 
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assertion that “because of” meant solely because of was so absurd to Justice 
Brennan that it only required a sentence and a footnote for him to dispose of 
the claim.211 An assertion that was so easy for Justice Brennan to reject, 
however, held the day in Nassar. To the majority, Gross’s reasoning was a 
good indication of the natural meaning and fair interpretation of the words of 
Title VII.212 Indeed, the majority never even addressed Congress’s rejection of 
the word “solely” in connection with the words “because of.”213 Apparently, at 
least in the eyes of the majority, a case that relied on the dictionary definition 
of a word is a better indicator of the meaning of the statute’s language than 
Congress’s own actions in drafting the statute. 
Moreover, even though the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse had 
previously determined that the words “because of” in the Title VII context did 
not mean “solely because of” but actually implied that discriminatory intent 
could not be a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse employment 
decision,214 the majority refused to give deference to Price Waterhouse.215 
According to the majority, Congress rejected all of Price Waterhouse when it 
enacted the 1991 Act.216 Such a bare assertion by the majority misconstrues 
what Congress actually did in passing the 1991 Act, however. While Congress 
did reject the part of Price Waterhouse that gave the employer the ability to 
avoid liability altogether by showing that it would have made the same 
employment decision absent a discriminatory intent,217 Congress actually 
embraced Price Waterhouse’s interpretation of the words “because of.”218 
Indeed, Congress codified the part of Price Waterhouse that allowed an 
 
VII violation as occurring only when prohibited discrimination was the sole ground for 
the personnel action. Senator Case responded: “The Senator from Arkansas, as always, 
seeks to provide the benefit of great clarity and simplicity in his objectives and methods. 
The difficulty with this amendment is that it would render [T]itle VII totally nugatory. If 
anyone ever had an action that was motivated by a single cause, he is a different kind of 
animal from any I know of. But beyond that difficulty, this amendment would place upon 
persons attempting to prove a violation of this section, no matter how clear the violation 
was, an obstacle so great as to make the title completely worthless. I therefore regret that 
we are obliged to oppose the amendment, and also to recommend that it be rejected.” The 
McClellan amendment and a similar proposal in the House were both defeated. 
Brodin, supra note 42, at 296–97. 
 211. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 n.7. Justice Brennan addressed the assertion by 
stating, “Moreover, since we know that the words ‘because of’ do not mean ‘solely because of,’ 
we also know that Title VII meant to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of 
legitimate and illegitimate considerations.” Id. at 241. 
 212. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534. 
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 214. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241. 
 215. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Compare Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242, with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2) (2006). 
 218. Compare Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242, with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
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employee to demonstrate that his or her protected status was a motivating 
factor in an employer’s adverse employment decision.219 Such a standard is 
only appropriate, however, if the words “because of” do not mean “solely 
because of.” Thus, in embracing Price Waterhouse’s motivating-factor 
standard, and implicitly rejecting the but-for standard advocated by the Price 
Waterhouse dissent, Congress clearly signaled that the words “because of” 
should not be construed to require but-for causation but should be construed to 
allow for a motivating-factor standard. Thus, even if the actual text of the 1991 
Act does not apply to Title VII retaliation claims, Price Waterhouse’s 
interpretation of “because of” should still govern, as it most closely reflects 
Congress’s indications that “because of” does not mean “solely because of.” 
Finally, the majority’s reliance on Gross is inappropriate. In Gross, the 
Supreme Court strenuously tried to distinguish Title VII from the ADEA, 
stating that “[b]ecause Title VII is materially different with respect to the 
relevant burden of persuasion . . . [decisions construing Title VII] do not 
control our construction of the ADEA.”220 Thus, the Supreme Court in Gross 
refused to give weight to cases interpreting Title VII in determining what 
“because of” meant under the ADEA.221 However, when the majority in 
Nassar was tasked with determining what “because of” meant under Title 
VII’s retaliation statute, it looked to Gross as a guiding light in its analysis and 
rejected Price Waterhouse as inconsistent with Gross.222 Therefore, according 
to the majority, while it is not appropriate to use Title VII cases to interpret 
“because of” under the ADEA, it is more than appropriate, even necessary, to 
give deference to ADEA cases in deciding how to interpret “because of” under 
Title VII. This very flip-flop between principles led Justice Ginsburg to ask the 
only natural question in this situation: “What sense can one make of this other 
than ‘heads the employer wins, tails the employee loses’?”223 
2. Supreme Court Precedent Demonstrates that Retaliation Is 
Discrimination 
The majority also failed to follow Supreme Court precedent that has 
consistently construed retaliation to be another form of discrimination.224 In the 
majority’s view, its previous decisions stated only a “general proposition that 
Congress’ enactment of a broadly phrased antidiscrimination statute may 
signal a concomitant intent to ban retaliation against individuals who 
 
 219. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). See also supra note 156. 
 220. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173 (2009). 
 221. Id. at 174. 
 222. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013). 
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oppose[d] that discrimination.”225 Because Title VII is a precise, complex, and 
exhaustive statute, the majority argued, the decisions which treat retaliation as 
an implicit corollary of status-based discrimination are inapposite.226 The 
majority’s sweeping dismissal of the precedential value of that line of cases, 
however, ignores the clear language and reasoning the Supreme Court used in 
deciding those cases. For example, in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of 
Education, the Supreme Court decided that a ban on sex discrimination under 
Title IX implicitly included a ban on retaliation because “[r]etaliation against a 
person because that person has complained of sex discrimination is another 
form of intentional sex discrimination.”227 Thus, retaliation against someone 
for complaining of status-based discrimination, according to the Supreme 
Court in Jackson, constituted intentional discrimination on the basis of that 
protected status.228 To the majority in Nassar, this reasoning only applies when 
it is a broad statute proscribing discrimination.229 As Justice Ginsburg aptly 
noted, however, “[i]t is strange logic indeed to conclude that when Congress 
homed in on retaliation and codified the proscription, as it did in Title VII, 
Congress meant protection against that unlawful employment practice to have 
less force than the protection available when the statute does not mention 
retaliation.”230 
The more informed interpretation, given the Court’s previous assertions 
that retaliation is just another form of status-based discrimination, is that 
references to status-based discrimination should be read to include retaliation. 
Thus, the motivating-factor standard adopted by the 1991 Act, because it 
applies to status-based discrimination claims, should also be read to apply to 
retaliation claims. 
3. Maintaining a But-For Causation Standard Does Not Save Judicial 
Resources 
The majority also noted that the proper interpretation of the causation 
standard for Title VII retaliation claims was important to the “fair and 
responsible allocation of resources in the judicial and litigation systems,” 
especially since “the number of retaliation claims filed with the EEOC has now 
outstripped those for every type of status-based discrimination except race.”231 
Though the majority did not say it in as many words, it clearly wanted to make 
it more difficult to bring a retaliation claim under Title VII to save judicial 
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resources and lessen the overall number of retaliation claims. The majority’s 
“judicial resources” argument for the need of heightened, but-for causation 
standard is flawed in many respects. 
To begin with, the majority improperly compared the number of Title VII 
retaliation claims to the number of each individual type of status-based 
discrimination claim.232 Claims under the antiretaliation statute are often 
brought in conjunction with claims under the antidiscrimination statute.233 
Thus, for every one claim brought under the status-based discrimination 
statute, whether it is for discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, 
religion, or color, there is likely an additional claim brought under the 
antiretaliation statute. Therefore, instead of comparing the overall number of 
retaliation claims to the number of claims under each type of status-based 
discrimination, i.e., to the number of race claims, the number of sex claims, 
etc., the much fairer comparison is to the overall number of status-based 
discrimination claims. Indeed, when making this comparison, it becomes clear 
that the overall number of status-based claims still greatly eclipse the overall 
number of retaliation claims.234 Thus, the need for a heightened causation 
standard for Title VII retaliation claims in order to save judicial resources is 
not as pressing as the majority would like it to seem. 
Moreover, even if a heighted standard would prevent more employees 
from filing claims under the antiretaliation statute, there is no guarantee that 
this would actually save judicial resources. As stated, these claims are often 
brought in conjunction with one another.235 While a heightened standard of 
causation for Title VII retaliation claims may prevent an individual from 
claiming retaliation, it would not prevent the individual from filing claims 
under the antidiscrimination statute. Thus, the overall number of charges may 
not meaningfully decrease. 
Moreover, the preservation of judicial resources is not a justifiable reason 
for trying to effectively close the courthouse doors to employees claiming 
retaliation under Title VII.236 Instead of enforcing a but-for causation standard 
 
 232. Id. 
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To be sure, judicial workload is a critical concern. As noted earlier, the lower courts have 
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Today, both federal district and appellate judges must contend with hundreds of filings 
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to make it less appealing to file a Title VII retaliation claim, the Supreme Court 
should focus on other ways to save judicial resources. 
Finally, the majority also argued that lessening the standard could 
contribute to the filing of frivolous claims and siphon resources away from 
administrative agencies trying to fight workplace discrimination.237 However, 
the EEOC, the administrative agency principally responsible for workplace 
discrimination claims, was not similarly worried about the filing of frivolous 
claims and the siphoning of its resources.238 In fact, the EEOC argued that the 
motivating-factor standard should apply to Title VII retaliation claims, making 
the majority’s assertion that it needed protection from frivolous claims 
unmoving.239 
B. But-For Standard Is Too Difficult to Prove and Too Hard to Apply 
The decision in Nassar is also flawed because the but-for causation 
standard is inappropriate in the Title VII context—it will be too difficult for 
employees to prove and too hard for juries to understand.240 The but-for 
causation standard requires the employee to show that his or her protected 
activity was the but-for cause of the employer’s adverse employment action, 
which essentially asks the employee to somehow determine what the employer 
would have done if it had not taken the protected activity into account.241 As 
Justice Breyer noted in his dissent in Gross, this is no easy task: 
It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show “but-for” causation. In 
that context, reasonably objective scientific or commonsense theories of 
physical causation make the concept of “but-for” causation comparatively easy 
to understand and relatively easy to apply. But it is an entirely different matter 
to determine a “but-for” relation when we consider, not physical forces, but the 
mind-related characterizations that constitute motive. . . . In a case where we 
characterize an employer’s actions as having been taken out of multiple 
motives, say, both because the employee was old and because he wore loud 
 
attorneys and other case-management tools to cope with their workload. Still, judges and 
scholars alike have called for an expansion of the bench and limiting the flow of cases to 
alleviate the strain on the federal courts. Thus, when the justices express their desire to 
avoid inviting new claims into federal courts, the underlying concern is not a trivial one. 
The critical question, though, is whether considerations of judicial workload can stand as 
an independent factor in shaping the Court’s interpretation of substantive law. . . . 
Therefore, although the Court may have a legitimate interest in ensuring that the number 
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 237. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2531–32 (2013). 
 238. See id. at 2533. 
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 241. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 190–91 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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clothing, to apply “but-for” causation is to engage in a hypothetical inquiry 
about what would have happened if the employer’s thoughts and other 
circumstances had been different. The answer to this hypothetical inquiry will 
often be far from obvious, and, since the employee likely knows less than does 
the employer about what the employer was thinking at the time, the employer 
will often be in a stronger position than the employee to provide the answer.242 
Thus, employees will have to demonstrate to the jury what the employer 
would have done in a different scenario, but doing so will require the employee 
to “get inside” the employer’s head to determine what it really thought when it 
made the adverse employment decision. Moreover, employees must make this 
showing even though the crucial evidence of what the employer would have 
done is under the control of the employer—the employee’s adversary in the 
retaliation claim.243 This places too great of a burden on employees trying to 
prove retaliation claims. 
Moreover, the but-for causation standard does not have a sufficiently 
strong deterrent effect. One of the main purposes of Title VII is to deter 
employers from discriminating against employees.244 The but-for causation 
standard, however, allows employers to retaliate against their employees as 
long as the retaliatory motive does not rise to the level of but-for causation.245 
Thus, employers are not deterred from engaging in discrimination. Unless the 
employee can succeed under the but-for causation standard—an unlikely event 
given that the employer holds the crucial evidence needed to prove the claim—
the employer will not be held liable for its retaliatory actions.246 
Furthermore, now that status-based discrimination claims and retaliation 
claims will be governed by two different causation standards, when the claims 
are brought together, the risk is much greater that juries will be confused and 
will have a difficult time applying the correct standard to each claim.247 On the 
status-based discrimination claim, juries will only have to determine if the 
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Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 515–16, 516 n.104 (2006). 
 244. Brodin, supra note 42, at 317. 
 245. See id. at 316–17. 
 246. See id. at 317. Brodin states: 
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Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 247. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2546 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
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discriminatory motive was a motivating factor in the employment decision,248 
while on the retaliation claim, the jury will have to determine that the 
discriminatory motive was the but-for cause of the employment action.249 As 
Justice Ginsburg notes, because the Supreme Court has enforced this 
heightened causation standard on retaliation claims, courts will surely struggle 
with how to properly instruct juries in these cases.250 
C. The Policy and Purpose Behind the Antiretaliation Statute Calls for a 
Lesser Standard 
Most importantly, the Nassar decision was wrongly decided because the 
purpose behind the antiretaliation statute calls for a lesser standard. Congress 
sought to eliminate workplace discrimination when it enacted Title VII.251 To 
this end, the status-based discrimination statute and retaliation statute are 
aimed at deterring employers from having a discriminatory or retaliatory 
motive when they make adverse employment decisions.252 Moreover, 
according to the Supreme Court, while the antidiscrimination statute “seeks a 
workplace where individuals are not discriminated against because of their 
racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based status,” the antiretaliation statute 
“seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an employer from 
interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or 
advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.”253 Thus, the two statues 
work hand-in-hand to accomplish Title VII’s objectives. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Metropolitan 
Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee provides a further 
explanation of the purpose of Title VII’s retaliation statute.254 In deciding to 
interpret the antiretaliation statute broadly to cover an employee who did not 
speak out about discrimination on her own initiative, the Supreme Court noted 
that employees would not be willing to report discrimination unless the 
antiretaliation statute constituted a meaningful remedy.255 The court 
hypothesized that “[i]f it were clear law that an employee who reported 
discrimination in answering an employer’s questions could be penalized with 
 
 248. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
 249. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534 (majority opinion). 
 250. Id. at 2535, 2546 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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 252. Id. at 320. 
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no remedy, prudent employees would have a good reason to keep quiet about 
Title VII offenses against themselves or against others.”256 
Beyond the Supreme Court’s explanation of the purpose behind Title VII’s 
antiretaliation statute, scholars have also documented the policy reasons behind 
broadly interpreting the antiretaliation statute in a way that provides the 
greatest amount of protection to employees as possible.257 Studies demonstrate 
that retaliation works to suppress discrimination claims.258 Indeed, “[f]ear of 
retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent instead of voicing their 
concerns about bias and discrimination.”259 If and when employees become 
willing to speak out against discrimination, retaliation steps in both to punish 
the employees and to return the workplace to its social norms.260 Given the 
relationship between challenging discrimination and retaliation, therefore, “the 
effectiveness and very legitimacy of discrimination law turns on people’s 
ability to raise concerns about discrimination without fear of retaliation.”261 
Thus, both the stated purpose behind Title VII and its antiretaliation statute 
and the policy behind interpreting retaliation statutes broadly demonstrate the 
need and appropriateness of allowing employees to proceed under a 
motivating-factor causation standard when bringing a Title VII retaliation 
claim. In fact, requiring the employee to demonstrate that his protected activity 
was the but-for cause of the employer’s adverse employment action directly 
contradicts these stated purposes as it makes it harder for an employee to 
succeed on a retaliation claim and, therefore, weakens the antiretaliation 
statute. As the Supreme Court has recognized, without a strong prohibition 
against retaliation, employees will be less willing to confront discrimination in 
the workplace.262 Title VII has no other meaningful enforcement mechanism, 
however. If employees refuse to police their employers and seek redress from 
discrimination, employers can continue to discriminate without much fear of 
being held accountable for their actions.263 Thus, for Title VII to be effective in 
carrying out its purpose, employees must feel free to speak out against 
discrimination in the workplace. Instead of encouraging employees to 
challenge workplace discrimination, however, the but-for causation standard 
will only discourage people from speaking out. Indeed, the best way to 
encourage employees to confront discrimination and make Title VII more 
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effective is to enforce a motivating-factor standard for Title VII retaliation 
claims, as it gives an employee a much better chance of succeeding on a 
retaliation claim if the employer chooses to respond via retaliation to the 
employee’s opposition to discrimination. 
VII.  PROPOSAL: CALL TO CONGRESS TO ACT 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar must be addressed. In deciding 
that Title VII retaliation claims must proceed under a but-for causation 
standard, the Supreme Court greatly limited the ability of employees to get 
relief for their employers’ retaliatory efforts. Such a result fails to adequately 
deter employers from engaging in retaliation. Moreover, the decision 
undermines the very purpose of Title VII in protecting employees from 
workplace discrimination. Without a strong prohibition against retaliation, 
employees will be less willing to confront discrimination in the workplace and 
the effectiveness of the prohibition against status-based discrimination will 
decrease.264 Congress previously took action after the Supreme Court cut back 
on the scope and effectiveness of antidiscrimination laws,265 and if it wants to 
ensure that the protections guaranteed under Title VII are still effective in 
eliminating workplace discrimination, Congress will need to act again. 
Other scholars have previously called on Congress to address the causation 
standard for Title VII retaliation claims.266 These scholars invited Congress to 
act before the Supreme Court decided Nassar. Now that the Supreme Court has 
signaled its clear intention to make it tougher for employees to succeed on 
retaliation claims, Congressional action is more important than ever. The only 
option left for employees to be properly protected against retaliation is for 
Congress to amend Title VII and create a motiving-factor provision for 
retaliation claims. 
A. The Proposed Options for Congressional Amendment to Title VII 
If Congress does choose to amend Title VII’s antiretaliation statute and 
overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar, Congress will have to decide 
which causation standard it should apply to retaliation claims. Congress may 
consider the following options: 1) the 1991 Act’s framework, 2) Price 
Waterhouse’s framework, 3) formulations of the motivating-factor standard 
found in lower courts, or 4) a complete overhaul of Title VII. 
Under the 1991 Act framework, employees claiming retaliation would 
need to demonstrate that their protected activity was a motivating factor in the 
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 265. See supra Part III; H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. II, at 2–4 (1991). 
 266. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 1073, 1105. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
934 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:897 
employer’s adverse employment action.267 If an employee could make this 
showing, the employer could then lessen the damages it would have to pay by 
demonstrating that it would have made the same employment decision 
regardless of the discriminatory motive.268 
Under the Price Waterhouse framework, employees would again need to 
only demonstrate that that their protected activity was a motivating factor in 
the employer’s adverse employment action.269 If an employee could make this 
showing, under this framework, the employer could avoid all liability by 
demonstrating that it would have made the same employment decision 
regardless of the discriminatory motive.270 
Congress could also decide to adopt one of the lower court’s formulations 
of the motivating-factor standard. Thus, it could require the employee to show 
by clear and convincing evidence (instead of the usual preponderance of the 
evidence) that a discriminatory motive was a motivating factor in an 
employment decision.271 After the employee made this showing, Congress 
could either allow the employer to avoid all liability or just lessen the damages 
award by proving that it would have made the same decision even in the 
absence of discrimination.272 
Finally, Congress could decide to completely overhaul Title VII instead of 
just amending Title VII to add a motivating-factor framework to the 
antiretaliation provision. 
B. The Best Option: Adding the 1991 Act’s Framework to the Antiretaliation 
Provision 
Congress should choose to enact an approach similar to the 1991 Act, as it 
strikes the right balance between employees’ and employers’ needs. The Price 
Waterhouse framework, although less employer friendly than the but-for 
causation standard, is still too employer friendly. While the first leg of the 
Price Waterhouse framework—requiring the employee to demonstrate that his 
protected activity was a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse 
employment decision273—may be appropriate to apply to Title VII retaliation 
claims, the second leg of Price Waterhouse warrants rejection of the 
framework as the best choice for a congressional amendment. The second leg 
allows the employer to escape liability by demonstrating that it would have 
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made the same decision regardless of the employer’s retaliatory intent.274 By 
allowing the employer a “get out of a jail free” card, the standard loses most, if 
not all, of its deterrent effect. Employers would still be able to have a 
retaliatory motive without facing any consequences. Furthermore, because the 
employer can escape liability even if it does take the employee’s protected 
activity into account, employees would be deterred from confronting 
discrimination in the workplace. 
Most importantly, however, Congress has already shown its contempt for 
the second leg of the Price Waterhouse framework.275 Indeed, Congress clearly 
believed that the second leg of the framework reduced the protections Title VII 
guaranteed to employees.276 When it added the motivating-factor framework to 
the status-based discrimination provision, it did not include the provision that 
allowed the employer to escape liability.277 Thus, on the whole, the Price 
Waterhouse standard is not the best option for Congress to choose if it does 
decide to amend Title VII. 
The other formulations within the lower courts are also too employer-
friendly and should be rejected. The formulations are variations on the 1991 
Act and Price Waterhouse frameworks. Both formulations use a motivating-
factor standard, but one formulation allows the employer to escape liability and 
the other allows the employer to lessen the damages it must pay.278 The key 
distinction is that the formulations require employees to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that their protected activity was a motivating factor in the 
adverse employment action.279 A requirement that the employee prove its 
claim by clear and convincing evidence, as opposed to preponderance of the 
evidence, places too high of a burden on employees. Most of the evidence 
showcasing why an employer made an adverse employment decision is in the 
hands of the employer,280 and therefore, the employee’s chance of having 
enough evidence to prove his or her claim under a clear and convincing 
standard is unlikely. In this way, the clear and convincing burden of proof 
defeats the purpose of having a motivating-factor standard, and these lower 
court formulations must also be rejected. 
At least one commentator has called on Congress to overhaul all of Title 
VII instead of amending it piece by piece.281 Although an overhaul may 
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provide the most benefit in the long run, getting Congress to completely 
overhaul Title VII is unlikely. In fact, to think that Congress would take the 
time to revisit all of Title VII is just downright unrealistic. Thus, at least in the 
interim, Congress needs to address the Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar 
and provide for a lesser causation standard for retaliation claims. 
Given the problems with the other options, if Congress were to amend 
Title VII and include a provision allowing for a lesser standard, the best option 
is to enact a standard similar to the 1991 Act’s framework. Indeed, the 1991 
Act’s framework strikes the right balance. The first leg of the approach allows 
the employee to demonstrate that his protected activity was a motivating factor 
in the adverse employment action,282 which properly protects employees and 
reassures them that employers will be held accountable for retaliatory acts. 
Thus, employees will be more willing to confront discrimination in the 
workplace, and Title VII’s provisions will become more effective. Moreover, 
by allowing employers to lessen the amount of damages they must pay by 
demonstrating that they would have made the same decision in the absence of 
the retaliatory motive,283 employers will still have a degree of protection. Thus, 
employers will still be deterred from engaging in retaliation, but employees 
will not receive a windfall by receiving compensation even if the employer 
would have made the same decision. 
In all, the 1991 Act’s standard most accurately reflects the purpose of the 
antiretaliation statute as well as the overall purpose of Title VII as a whole. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar created an unnecessary hurdle to 
jump through in order to succeed on a Title VII retaliation claim. By enforcing 
a but-for causation standard for Title VII retaliation claims, the Supreme Court 
weakened the protection employees need against the retaliatory actions of their 
employers and, in turn, lessened the effectiveness of Title VII’s status-based 
discrimination statute in creating a discrimination-free workplace. If left 
unaddressed, the decision will threaten the very purpose of Title VII. 
Therefore, Congress must respond to the Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar. 
Indeed, Congress should add a provision to Title VII’s antiretaliation statute 
that creates a motivating-factor standard for retaliation claims similar to the 
motivating-factor provision already in place for status-based discrimination 
claims.  By amending  Title VII  and  adding  a  motivating-factor standard  for 
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retaliation claims, Congress will restore the protections guaranteed to 
employees and signal to the Supreme Court its desire that Title VII be read in a 
way that furthers the goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace. 
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